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THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE NETWORK*
Joel R. Reidenberg**
Franqoise Gamet-Pol***
In this article, Professors Reidenberg and Gamet-Pol address pri-
vacy issues created by the expanding information infrastructure. Due
to the historical trend of self-regulation in the private sector, they
concentrate their attention on this area, where the possibilities for
abuse are great and are detrimental to individual privacy interests.
They begin by identifying key values for the treatment of personal
information in a networked society: confidence of citizens and busi-
nesses, availability and accessibility of information, quality of infor-
mation, and interoperability with the Global Information
Infrastructure. The analysis then focuses on the relationship between
these values, the characteristics of the emerging information networks,
and the existing legal rules for private sector regulation. From this
analysis, it becomes clear that new incentives must emerge to promote
new rules in the private sector if we wish to maintain our commitment
to the key values in the networks.
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INTRODUCTION
The emerging information infrastructure places standards for the fair
treatment of personal information at a critical juncture. Information
technology and information flows on expanding networks have restruc-
tured economic, political, and social organization. In essence, the "Infor-
mation Society" is both a reality and a global enterprise. The capabilities
of information technology linked to seamless networks offer revolutionary
advances for "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."' Telemedicine
will bring the best international expertise to rural doctors in North Caro-
lina, Internet forums will open opportunities for "town meetings" across
the country, and mobile communications will expand personal horizons
exponentially. At the same time, however, these very seamless networks
raise the fear of an Orwellian "Big Brother." Digital communications
leave traces and portraits of every interaction with the network, and these
traces may be put to a variety of unwanted secondary uses. Privacy is
thus thrust to the forefront of policy discussions among businesses, gov-
ernments, and citizens.2
This article explores some of the implications of an information in-
frastructure on privacy and confidence in the emerging networks. As part
of this exploration, this article searches the contours of society's interest
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. See, e.g., The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg.
49,025-49,035 (1993); Europe and the Global Information Society, Recommendations to the
European Council 18 (Brussels, May 26, 1994) [also known widely as the Bangemann Re-
port] available on Internet, http://www.earn.net.
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in the treatment of personal information and explores the new landscape
of legal and policy values. Part I articulates some of the key values for the
treatment of personal information in a networked, information society. It
argues that public and private confidence is indispensable for robust net-
works to flourish, and such confidence, in turn, depends on the fair treat-
ment of personal information. This part also stresses the social value of
the available and accessible information with a concomitant dedication to
the quality of information. This section further argues that quality re-
quires participation by citizens and businesses in decisions about the cir-
culation of personal information. Finally, part I expresses the value of
interoperability of information networks across borders.
Part II analyzes some characteristics of emerging networks and dem-
onstrates new challenges posed by the Global Information Infrastructure.
In particular, this part examines decentralized information processing,
multiple uses of information, and cross-sectoral uses. The section also de-
scribes the beneficial characteristics of network globalization.
In part III, this article examines the links between network values,
characteristics, and existing legal rules. This part provides an overview of
the treatment of personal information in the United States with particu-
lar emphasis on telecommunications. Finally, this section argues that
some of the network values are advanced by existing rules, while others,
such as confidence and data quality, are distorted.
Part IV concludes this article with an analysis of the incentives that
push for greater congruence between network values and legal rules. This
part determines that governmental pressure, both domestic and interna-
tional, combined with greater citizen pressure on businesses is required to
set this evolution in motion.
I. KEY VALUES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL INFORMATION IN A
NETWORKED SOCIETY
The effective penetration of information technology in society and
the advancement of a network infrastructure depend upon the fulfillment
of key values for the treatment of personal information. While networks
may bring great benefits to society, they also may give rise to social costs
associated with the use of personal information. This is especially true
due to the fact that a number of essential values relate to the treatment
of personal information.
A. Creating and Preserving Confidence of Citizens and Business in
Information
One of the most striking findings of a recent opinion poll was that
confidence in the fair treatment of personal information is an important
factor to citizens in deciding whether to participate in the "National In-
formation Infrastructure. '' 3 Similarly, the integrity of networks is a criti-
3. Louis Harris & Assoc., Inc., Interactive Services, Consumers, and Privacy: A Na-
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cal factor for the growth of business opportunities on an information
infrastructure.
4
At present, both citizens and businesses in the United States lack
confidence in our information-based society. A majority of Americans be-
lieve that they have lost control of their personal information. A growing
number of individuals decline to engage in some form of commercial rela-
tionship, such as applying for jobs, credit, or insurance, and refrain from
economic participation in society to avoid disclosing personal informa-
tion.5 While industry had promoted self-regulatory policies for almost
twenty years,6 public opinion has recently ceased to view industry treat-
ment of personal information as benign.7
Businesses too have an increasingly common stake in the treatment
of information on networks. Traditionally, the issue of confidence from
the business side has not received much attention. Businesses often ap-
peared to be potential abusers rather than potential victims since they
were "users" of personal information rather than "producers." The ex-
pansion of information networks gives the business sector commercial
reasons to desire a fair treatment of information. With heightened public
concern for privacy, businesses will receive less information from individ-
uals, thereby reducing commercial activity, if fair treatment is not per-
ceived to exist widely.
Further, despite the more popular image of businesses using the per-
sonal information of consumers, businesses also produce identifying infor-
mation themselves. As producers, businesses must be able to rely on the
fair treatment of their own information. For example, when a communi-
cations company planned to profile the calling patterns of households in
order to send them a directory of businesses with 800 numbers for ser-
vices those households used, the key opponents turned out to be the busi-
ness clients of the communications company.8 The business clients
tional Survey xvii (1994) (a survey conducted for Privacy & American Business) [hereinaf-
ter Interactive Services].
4. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN A
NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 3 (1994) [hereinafter OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY].
5. Interactive Services, supra note 3, at xiii. A 1990 report showed that only 42% of
Americans had "ever refused to give information to a business or company because they
thought it was not really needed or was too personal." Louis Harris & Assocs. & Alan F.
Westin, Equifax, Inc., The Equifax Report on Consumers in the Information Age, VI
(1990), in Domestic and International Data Protection Issues: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Gov-
ernment Operations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1991) [hereinafter The 1990 Equifax
Report]. The 1994 survey shows that this figure has risen to 70%, that is to say an increase
of 28% in four years. Interactive Services, supra note 3, at xiii (quoting The 1990 Equifax
Report, supra).
6. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974) reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6929-31 (explaining why the Privacy Act of 1974 was not extended to the
private sector); PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1977) 34-35 [hereinafter PRIVACY STUDY REPORT].
7. Surveys show that the public believes the excessive collection of personal informa-
tion by industry is a major problem. See Interactive Services, supra note 3, at xii.
8. Terry Brennan, CADM Releases Its Unanimous Objection to AT&T 800 Directory;
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objected to telephone subscribers receiving a directory of competitors' toll
free numbers.9
The critical importance of confidence is also well demonstrated by a
recent United States governmental encryption proposal. The executive
branch proposed a key escrow system using technology called the "Clip-
per Chip" in an effort to balance confidentiality of communications on
digital networks with the government's capability to conduct wiretaps.10
Privacy advocates and business lobbies were united in their opposition to
the proposal. For privacy advocates, the proposal conjured up fears of
massive governmental snooping on communications. For business, the
proposal jeopardized the ability to use higher levels of security to pre-
serve data integrity traveling on public information highways.11
For networks to develop and sustain the confidence of their partici-
pants, citizens and businesses must both be afforded a high degree of in-
volvement in the decisions about the circulation of identifying data. This
requires openness of policies and practices for the treatment of informa-
tion. Citizens, businesses, and governments, when confronted with net-
work issues, have each demonstrated a distrust of information practices
that grew from decisions made on a non-inclusive basis. Citizens feel they
have lost control of personal information. Businesses feel threatened by
externally imposed security standards. Governments feel handicapped in
law enforcement capabilities. To overcome these obstacles and to bolster
confidence, each interested side must be involved in setting rules for fair
treatment of information on an information infrastructure.
B. Promoting Information Availability and Accessibility
If personal information is available and accessible, the Global Infor-
mation Infrastructure can make significant contributions to the quality of
life in the Information Society. 12 Businesses can customize products and
services, and managers can improve productivity while operating busi-
nesses from remote locations. 3
In these ways and others, a wide array of data permits greater flexi-
bility and value to an Information Society. Rules and safeguards for legit-
imate access and use of personal information should therefore set
minimal barriers for healthy information sharing arrangements."'
Joins Other Industry Leaders, DM NEws, Oct. 7, 1991 at 1.
9. Id.
10. Telecommunications Network Security: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 38-40 (1993) (statement of Raymond Kammer, Acting Director, NIST).
11. See OTA, INFORMATION SECURrrY, supra note 4, at 170-72.
12. For example, Levis jeans can now be made to order through a networked informa-
tion processing system linked to an automated sewing factory. Glen Rifkin, Digital Blue
Jeans Pour Data and Legs into Customized Fit, N.Y. Tmzms, Nov. 8, 1994, at Al.
13. Nearly one in five Americans (17%) either operates a business from his or her
home or does considerable amounts of office work at home. Interactive Services, supra note
3, at xi.
14. See id. at xv-xvii.
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C. Assuring Quality Information
A robustly networked society depends upon quality information. Be-
cause of the intangible nature of information, quality derives from the
conditions surrounding the data. Only the fair treatment of personal in-
formation gives maximum value. Quality information reconciles the val-
ues of all interested parties-citizens, business, and society. Participation
on an equal footing in a networked society gives value to personal infor-
mation. Private citizens must be able to take part in the use of their per-
sonal information. Indeed, easy access to personal information will
improve the accuracy of information since individuals will have the op-
portunity to check and correct their personal information. Similarly, this
right of access will ensure the validity of information. The business com-
munity needs to develop a broad consensus on fair information practice
standards. Above all, it must be remembered that quality requires fair
and permissible uses,15  relevancy, 16  timeliness, 7  accuracy, 8  and
reliability. 9
D. Ensuring "Interoperability" on the Global Information
Infrastructure
Networks and information transmissions are global in nature, and
few would deny that divergent norms in a global information economy
pose problems. 20 Consequently, information standards cannot be devel-
oped solely on a national level. Indeed, the European Commission has
noted that if countries were to adopt varying standards, "efforts to guar-
15. Information should be collected lawfully for specific purposes. Amended Proposal
for a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Eur. Comm. Doe. COM(92) 422,
final-SYN 287, art. 6(1)(b) (Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinafter Amended Proposal]; The Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation & Dev., Recommendations of the Council Concerning
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
Sept. 23, 1980, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(80)58, final (Oct. 1, 1980), pt. 2, §§ 7-8, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 422 (1981) [hereinafter O.E.C.D. Guidelines]; Convention of the Council of Europe for
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data art. 5,
opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. T.S. No. 108, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 317 (1981)
[hereinafter Council of Europe Convention]. Likewise, secondary uses must be limited.
Amended Proposal, supra, art. 6(1) (b); the O.E.C.D. Guidelines, supra, pt. 2, §§ 9-10;
Council of Europe Convention, supra, art. 5b.
16. The collection of extraneous information is proscribed by a commonly accepted
standard that can be found in Amended Proposal, supra note 15, art. 6(1)(c); O.E.C.D.
Guidelines, supra note 15, pt. 2, § 8; Council of Europe Convention, supra note 15, art. 5c.
17. Amended Proposal, supra note 15, art. 6(e); O.E.C.D. Guidelines, supra note 15,
pt. 2, § 8; Council of Europe Convention, supra note 15, art. 5e.
18. Amended Proposal, supra note 15, arts. 6(1)(d), 13; O.E.C.D. Guidelines, supra
note 15, pt. 2, §§ 8, 12-13; Council of Europe Convention, supra note 15, art. 8c.
19. See Amended Proposal, supra note 15, art. 17; O.E.C.D. Guidelines, supra note 15,
pt. 2, § 11; Council of Europe Convention, supra note 15, art. 7.
20. See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to
Transnational Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. S137 (1992) [hereinafter
Reidenberg, Privacy Obstacle Course].
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antee a high level of protection could be nullified by transfers [of personal
information] to other countries in which the protection provided is inade-
quate. '21 To accomplish true data protection then, American standards of
fair information practice must be "interoperable" with worldwide trends
in data privacy. Only in this way can we maintain the competitive posi-
tion of American business on the Global Information Infrastructure.
II. SOME EMERGING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NETWORK22
The Global Information Infrastructure transforms American society
both economically and politically. From a domestic point of view, it offers
numerous multimedia services, thereby bringing a major shift in informa-
tion processing and enabling the decentralization of information process-
ing, the multiplication of uses, and the increase of cross-sectoral uses.
From an international point of view, it allows real-time access to data and
information services across borders.
A. Major Shift in Information Processing Systems
In the 1960s and early 1970s, computing and telecommunications
were generally controlled by the federal government and large corpora-
tions.2 3 The emergence of personal computers and networking in the mid-
1980s, however, contributed to a shift in power to the commercial sector.
Smaller private-sector organizations gained access to sophisticated infor-
mation-processing capabilities through inexpensive equipment. Individu-
als and small, private organizations obtained access to vast information
resources through services such as Prodigy, Compuserve, and America
Online. In essence, the Internet and private networks gave globalized ac-
cess to information to both individuals and small organizations. Global-
ized access to information and real-time interactivity multiply the options
available to users of information, both individuals and businesses. Inter-
active communications produce numerous transaction records, thereby
multiplying choices regarding the use of information as well.
At the beginning of the 1990s, information processing was decentral-
izing even within large corporations as networks replaced mainframe
computers. Today, in the mid-1990s, the decentralization of information
processing has made omnipresent surveillance possible by organizations
and even individuals. This decentralization enables any network partici-
pant to centralize data, for although bits of information are scattered
throughout the network, they are accessible from any place on the net-
work. This, however, is not the extent of decentralization's effects. So-
phisticated information providers and intelligent networks already enable
combinations of audiovisual images and sounds with other interactive ser-
21. Amended Proposal, supra note 15, Explanatory Memorandum.
22. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Information Flows on the Global Infobahn, in
THE NEW INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEcIES FOR U.S. POLICY (Win. J. Drake ed.,
forthcoming May 1995).
23. See generally PRIVACY STUDY REPORT, supra note 6.
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vices. Further, decentralization of information processing in the United
States dramatically broadened the role of private-sector data processing
and shifted power from the federal government to private-sector organi-
zations. These private organizations now have exclusive control over the
decisions regarding the collection and use of personal information.
B. Blurring Boundaries
As interactive communications proliferate, transaction information or
"information about information" is commonly generated in the context of
service provision. Transaction generated information occurs in fields
ranging from the obvious, like interactive media, to the unsuspecting, like
employment.
Because of easy access to multiple sources of data and because there
are few existing legal restrictions on the use of information, secondary use
of collected information is significant.24 Personal information is often col-
lected in one context for a particular purpose and used in another context
for a different purpose. For example, telephone billing requires the
processing of information relating to the caller, the number called, the
duration of the call, the time of the call, and the billing rate. Similarly,
caller identification services disclose the originator of incoming calls. Yet,
this information, when stored, is used to develop profiles of individuals
for other uses, such as direct marketing. The network not only generates
personal information in similar fashion across industries, but it also takes
information generated in one industrial sector and enables its use in
another.
The network itself also amplifies this tendency and decreases confi-
dence in privacy by giving numerous private actors easy access to per-
sonal transaction information. For example, caller identification
technology, combined with data capture equipment and information ser-
vice offerings, allows even small companies to build profiles of individuals
in previously unimaginable detail.25
In addition to their diminishing effect on sectoral boundaries, net-
works also blur national borders. The Global Information Infrastructure,
through network activity, links great distances and traditional bounda-
ries. At the international level, networks allow real-time access to data
and information across long and short distances. Miles are traversed in
seconds and international boundaries become little more than imaginary
lines on maps, as borders become defined in terms of networks rather
than countries. 26
24. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Fron-
tier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. CoMm. L.J. 195, 200-08 (1992) [hereinafter Reidenberg,
Privacy in the Information Economy].
25. For a further discussion of the types of profiles created with transaction informa-
tion, see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
26. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Symposium: Electronic Communications and Local
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III. FORGING LINKS BETWEEN VALUES AND CHARACTERISTICS
The Global Information Infrastructure's characteristics pose chal-
lenges to fundamental values for an information society. Present legal
rules and standards for electronic communications offer disjointed links
between the values and characteristics. While some values may be ad-
vanced by the match between net characteristics and existing rules,
others are not.
A. The Legal Landscape and Setting Standards
The treatment of personal information in the private-sector is ad-
dressed in a reactive, ad hoc manner. Specific laws answer particular con-
cerns. Until recently, most issues were addressed by self-regulation, an
ideology having great symbolic meaning in the United States. With the
American legal system's preference for drawing fair information practice
standards from varied and diverse sources, it comes as no great surprise
that the United States legal system tends to disregard present interna-
tional trends.
1. U.S. standards: ad hoc, targeted, and confused
Despite the development of the multi-layered information society,
the United States develops legal rules for standards of fair information
practice in an ad hoc, targeted fashion .27 This specificity is due, in part,
to American business lobbying, which has managed to maintain narrow
privacy protection for individuals in spite of the decentralization and the
growing role of private sector data processing. Industry, to some extent,
proposes voluntary standards for particular problems.28 As a result,
targeted standards and specific restrictions govern the treatment of per-
sonal information. Decentralization of information processing and wider
information use have not altered the narrow focus of U.S. regulatory
policy.
2. The religion of self-regulation
This ad hoc, issue-by-issue conception of governance has two conse-
quences in the area of information. First, there is the recognition of the
principle of the free flow of information. As Justice Brandeis wrote, the
Changes: Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the Trade and Tech-
nical Paradigms, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 287, 303 (1993) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Rules of the
Road].
27. See Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy, supra note 24, at 195.
28. See, e.g., DIRECT MKTG. ASS'N, DIRECT MARKETING: OPENING THE DOOR TO OPPOR-
TUNITY: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING How DIRECT MARKETERS USE INFORMATION 9-10
(discussing how Direct Marketing Association Mail Preference Service allows consumers to
have their names and addresses suppressed from mailing lists for junk mail solicitations);
PRIVACY STUDY REPORT, supra note 6, at 34 ("In the private sector, the commission specifies
voluntary compliance when the present need for the recommended change is not acute
enough to justify mandatory legislation.").
1995]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
First Amendment-itself closely linked to the concept of protection of
the citizen against the state-secures the "freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think. ' 29 Liberty of thought presupposes that infor-
mation be freely available, and thus is usually believed to conflict with
government-imposed restrictions."0 Second, sectoral restrictions, if any,
are preferred over comprehensive rules on the treatment of personal in-
formation. Following the principle of free flow of information, legislatures
respond only to specific issues.3 ' Legal standards are justified only where
targeted for a particular problem: therefore, standards often develop on
an ad hoc basis, by reaction to public scandals. Examples include the pro-
tection of video rental records following the disclosure of records for a
nominee to the U.S. Supreme Courts2 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
which was enacted in response to consumer horror stories about dealing
with credit reporting agencies.33
Traditionally, the business community opposes the establishment of
legal standards: it prefers to resort to self-regulation to assure fair stan-
dards for treatment of personal information in American society. Yet, the
experiences resulting in legislation and the discomfort of prominent busi-
nesses with industry practices show that the sectoral restrictions on the
treatment of information have not been sufficient.
3. A few particular rules for telecommunications
In a digital environment, the treatment of message content and
transaction information are critical for the promotion of key values. The
net makes the distinction artificial. Message content is just as searchable
and malleable as transaction profile data. Despite this similarity in acces-
sibility and options, however, current law differentiates between the two.
a. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act,3 4 along with a number of similar state laws,
29. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
30. This conflict is a traditional view that Professor Sunstein persuasively criticizes.
CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTMoN 197-256 (1993).
31. See, e.g., The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. V
1993); The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993); The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
The Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a) (1988); PRIVACY STUDY REPORT,
supra note 6, at 34. See generally Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Dis-
continuous: The Failure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6
SOftWARE L.J. 199 (1993) (explaining the results of legislative attempts to codify standards
of fair information practices); Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy, supra note
24 (arguing state legislation is narrowly focussed). In the public sector, however, legislatures
have sought broader regulation. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); Paul Schwartz, Data Protection and Participation, Symposium, 80 IowA L.
REV. - (forthcoming March 1995).
32. See The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
33. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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offers a variety of standards for the handling of message content. In es-
sence, legal rights offer protection from unauthorized collection and re-
cording. 5 Yet, the legal rights emphasize protection against governmental
intrusions in the private lives of citizens." The government can only ac-
cess private communications with a court order and for a specified law
enforcement purpose.3 7 As for the provider of a public telecommunica-
tions service, it may not disclose the contents of an electronic mail mes-
sage without the consent of at least one of the parties."' Legal rights also
prevent third parties from accessing electronic mail messages without au-
thorization." In addition, computer crime legislation prohibits individuals
from accessing computer systems, including electronic mail files, without
authorization.
40
Once the network records message content, senders or recipients may
generally make multiple use of the recording even for secondary pur-
poses.41 In the case of private networks, the network operator may also
use electronic mail message content for secondary purposes. 42 This issue
arises in the context of employee monitoring.
Unlike the protection afforded to content, however, U.S. telecommu-
nications laws generally do not require the identification of purposes for
the collection of transaction generated information. There is no specific
restriction against overextensive collections of personal information for
transaction data. Nor is there any restriction on the duration of storage
for transaction generated information. Few obligations exist for openness
or transparency with respect to the treatment of transaction generated
information. Networks now provide caller identification automatically
and even household recipients have the same data capture ability as large
companies operating toll free services. Significantly, the law provides few
restraints on secondary use of traffic data. While it is true that transac-
tion information is a valuable tool for surveillance, lifestyle profiling, and
product marketing, these uses can be both beneficial and nefarious.
b. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. The recent
Telephone Consumer Protection Act,43 which restricts the use of auto-
35. Id. § 2702.
36. The law prohibits the federal government from obtaining personal information
without a specified law enforcement purpose. In addition, the recent Communications Assis-
tance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279, 4292 (1994),
created stricter requirements for the federal government in obtaining a court order to access
transaction information.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
38. Id. §§ 2511(3)(b), 2702(b).
39. Id. § 2511(1).
40. Id. § 2701 (1993).
41. This is not the case in the few states that have "two party consent" rules. See
Maryland Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Act, MD. CODE ANN., §§ 10-401 to 10-414
(1989).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c).
43. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 and Pub. L. No. 102-556, 106 Stat. 4185 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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matic dialing equipment, was cast as an important piece of privacy legis-
lation.4 4 In reality, this act was meant to address nuisance telephone calls
to households. 45 In implementing the act, the Federal Communications
Commission originally contemplated a national "do not call" database of
individuals who wanted to opt out of telemarketing calis.4" Marketers did
not favor the concept of losing control of the database and the final regu-
lations took an approach more oriented toward the private sector.
Telemarketing companies were allowed to make the first unwanted call
and then had to maintain their own "do not call" lists from individuals
who requested to opt-out.47 While the law is primarily directed at nui-
sance problems, the statute provides a measure of fair information prac-
tice for the use of household telephone numbers.
4. Other normative sources'
8
The American system values a diversity of sources for fair informa-
tion practice standards to prevent any single actor from controlling infor-
mation flows. Specific standards for fair information practices come from
various sources. First, there are legal rules, including specific pieces of
legislation, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act"9 or the Video Privacy
Protection Act,50 as well as more general statutes with some bearing on
the treatment of information like the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act. 1 Second, there is technology, which may structure the treatment of
personal information through technological choices and technical deci-
sions. Third, there are industry norms and business practices, in particu-
lar, industry codes of conduct which may establish an ethos for an
industrial sector,52 company policies and their implementation, 2 contrac-
44. While the law has been held unconstitutional by a federal court, the grounds did
not relate to fair information practices. See Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993)
(holding act's ban on use of artificial or pre-recorded voices to deliver commercial messages
to residential telephones without consent of recipient placed unconstitutional content-based
restriction on protected commercial speech in violation of First Amendment). See generally
Rita Marie Cain, Call Up Someone and Just Say 'Buy'-Telemarketing and the Regula-
tory Environment, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. 641, 649-55 (1994) (discussing telemarketing regulation,
including Telephone Consumer Protection Act and Moser decision).
45. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8753 (1992).
46. Id. at 8754-55.
47. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2) (1993).
48. For a further discussion of the three main sources of fair information norms, see
Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IowA L. REv. - (forthcoming March 1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Setting
Standards].
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1988).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17.
52. See, e.g., DIRECT MKTG. ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION
(1992) [hereinafter DMA GUIDELINES]; INFORMATION INDUS. ASS'N, FAIR INFORMATION PRAC-
TICES GUIDELINES, POLICY STATEMENT (1994).
53. See, e.g., American Express, Cardmember Privacy, Mailing and Telemarketing Op-
tions (1994); Citibank Visa & Mastercard, Privacy Policy (1993).
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tual arrangements between companies and individuals or business cus-
tomers and, lastly, good corporate citizenship resulting from pressures of
public opinion, academia, advocacy groups, and governmental officials.
Industry codes are generally weak sources of information practice
standards because the fairness of practices remains at the level of com-
pany activity. Likewise, company policies are not legally binding. Finally,
corporate citizenship, though not mandatory, may prove more efficient for
stimulating business practices because of the potential public relations
embarrassments associated with poor practices. A number of private com-
panies are now implementing new standards in order to promote good
corporate citizenship.54
This justification for decentralized sources is the anticipated flexibil-
ity of such a resulting system to adapt to specific conditions. This ration-
ale draws on the same thinking as the federalist goal of making the states
"laboratories" for appropriate kinds of regulation.55
Since varied sources offer overlapping and distinct standards of
treatment, this argument is not convincing. The standards applicable to
the private sector derive from the combination of standards implemented
through each source. Rather than flexibility, this brings excessive com-
plexity, especially when associated with the pursuit of targeted standards.
Targeted standards from diverse sources make an accurate assessment of
the treatment of personal information in the private sector elusive.
The narrow and complex nature of American standards for fair infor-
mation practices encourages parochialism. This situation brings about a
disregard for international trends and standards regarding the treatment
of personal information and the protection of privacy.
5. The American disregard for international trends and standards
Other countries, particularly European countries, have approached
the treatment of personal information in a comprehensive manner and
have adopted broad legislation which seeks to balance freedom of infor-
mation against privacy rights. Such legislation, called "data protection
laws," usually covers both the public and private sectors and sets out
principles for the fair collection, storage, use, and dissemination of per-
54. Equifax and Dun & Bradstreet have recently included commitments to privacy in
their annual reports. See DUN & BRADSTREET, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT (1993), available in
LEXIS, Naars library, 93 file; EQUIFAX, INc., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (1992), available in
LEXIS, Naars library, 92 file. American Express also provides a detailed privacy notice to
cardholders on an annual basis. The exact wording of this notice was prescribed by the New
York Attorney General's Office. See American Express Travel Related Services, Inc., Agree-
ment of Voluntary Assurances, May 8, 1992 (on file with the Attorney General of the State
of New York, Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection).
55. This famous description of the goals for federalism comes from a Brandeis dissent
in New State Ice, Co v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). See Reidenberg, Setting Stan-
dards, supra note 48.
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sonal information."
This world-wide trend toward broader, more comprehensive legisla-
tion is reflected particularly in the proposed European data privacy direc-
tive,57 currently under active deliberation. This proposal, as well as
existing national laws in many European countries such as Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, allows the
prohibition of data transfers to countries perceived to lack sufficient pri-
vacy protection. Governments in other places, such as Quebec,55 have
adopted novel legislation, while elsewhere, in Japan for example,59 gov-
ernments are also examining their present fair information practice poli-
cies. According to one source, more than thirty countries around the
world are focussing on new fair information practice rules.60
Thus far, the United States has either sought to avoid the trend or to
ignore international standards."1 In the late 1970s, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.)6 2 and the Council of
Europe 3 began developing comprehensive principles for fair information
practices.6 4 The O.E.C.D. emphasized the free flow of information, 5 while
the Council of Europe favored a stronger emphasis on the protection of
human rights.66 The United States participated only in the O.E.C.D. ef-
forts and succeeded in having the final document considered only a set of
voluntary standards, rather than mandatory rules. The Council of Europe
instrument, however, became a binding international treaty and many
countries enacted comprehensive national laws in response to it. Conspic-
uously, the United States did not become a signatory to the treaty. Con-
sequently, there is no formal United States representation at multilateral
meetings of foreign Privacy Commissioners to discuss standards.
More recently, during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)67 and the negotiations of the North Ameri-
56. See Reidenberg, Privacy Obstacle Course, supra note 20, at S137-S177 (describing
such statutes).
57. See generally Amended Proposal, supra note 15; Robert G. Boehmer & Todd S.
Palmer, The 1992 EC Data Protection Proposal: An Examination of its Implications for
U.S. Business and U.S. Privacy Law, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. 265, 265-311 (1993) (comparing
Amended Proposal with previous 1990 version).
58. See Loi No. 68 sur la protection des renseignements personnels dans le secteur
priv6, Assemble Nationale, Deuxibme Session, Trente-quatrime Lbgislature (1992).
59. See Reidenberg, Privacy Obstacle Course, supra note 20, at S170-S171.
60. See Bojana Bellamy, Data Protection Roundup, PRIVAcY LAWS & Bus., Oct. 1992,
at 2.
61. See Fred H. Cate, The Future of Communications Policy Making, 3 WMs. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 1, 10 (1994) (stating that "the United States ... has often resisted participa-
tion in multinational policy level agreements" regarding information regulation).
62. The O.E.C.D. was founded in 1960 by 20 states, including the United States, to
foster economic cooperation among industrialized nations.
63. The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental association organized to promote
human rights issues.
64. O.E.C.D. Guidelines, supra note 15; Council of Europe Convention, supra note 15.
65. See O.E.C.D. Guidelines, supra note 15, Appendix § 25.
66. See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 15, Preamble.
67. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
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can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), s privacy was discussed as a possi-
ble barrier to trade." The United States rejected proposals for a fair
information practices code due to the strong opposition of American busi-
ness lobbies.70 Each instrument provides only for minimal restrictions on
information flows: in the case of GATT, only for security and confidenti-
ality purposes; in the case of NAFTA, only for the protection of sub-
scriber privacy 11
Because of this history and its ongoing repetition, the United States'
treatment of personal information is under great scrutiny. The European
Union, in particular, is taking an active interest in American privacy law
and practice. With passage of the European data privacy directive almost
assured, the United States is taking greater notice of global issues and the
importance of working in tandem with foreign trends rather than against
them.
B. The Key Values Advanced by the Existing Landscape
1. Widely available and accessible information
Networks and the existing narrow regulations of information flows
offer broad access to information. This has been the case since the mid-
1980s with the emergence and development of personal computers and
private networks. Information technology is becoming ever less expensive.
Both individuals and small businesses have access to vast information re-
sources, such as those available through the Internet and private net-
works like Prodigy or America On Line. The existing landscape erects few
barriers to access to information.
This widely available information leads to improvements in daily life
and in an increase of options: a growing number of Americans operate
businesses from their homes; many students work from their homes
through the use of personal computers and have access to a huge volume
Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
68. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, re-
printed in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (implemented in United States by North American Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993)) [herein-
after NAFTA].
69. See Reidenberg, Rules of the Road, supra note 26, at 294-95.
70. See Communications from the United States, Annex, Annex to and use of Services
of Public Telecommunications Transport Services, GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/2/97 (Mar. 23,
1990) (outlining U.S. position during telecommunications annex negotiations).
71. See GATT, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, Annex on Telecommunications (Apr. 15, 1994), available in
WESTLAW, IEL Database, I.E.L. I-B-64, at *741-50, art. 5(d) ("[A] Member may take such
measures as are necessary to ensure the security and confidentiality of messages, subject to
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade in ser-
vices."); NAFTA ch. 13, available in WESTLAW, NAFTA Database, 1993 WL 574438, at
*2, art. 1302(5) (stating that parties may take necessary measures "to ensure the security
and confidentiality of messages" and to "protect the privacy of subscribers to public tele-
communications transport networks or services").
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of data. This broad access also allows providers of goods and services to
develop profile information on potential consumers, and thus to custom-
ize their offerings to those consumers. With fair information practices, the
customization will match consumer needs and desires.
Information may not be available and accessible to all, however. In
particular, access barriers are not low when citizens seek access to their
own personal information. This aspect is problematic because any infor-
mation can be included in some compiled profiles, and often companies
do not permit the concerned individuals to access their own personal in-
formation. For example, Metromail, one of the largest sellers of personal
information about consumers in the United States, ignores requests for
access.7 2 Hypocritically, Metromail purports to follow the Direct Market-
ing Association's privacy guidelines and serves on the DMA Privacy Task
Force which is dedicated to promoting fair information practices within
the trade association.
2. Limited quality information
Though the quantity of information is unquestionably promoted by
the existing landscape, the quality of information may be less advanced.
As previously argued, the quality depends on standards for permissible
uses, relevance, timeliness, accuracy, and reliability.7 3
Since no set of general and comprehensive rules establish these qual-
ity standards and specific, targeted statutes rarely offer the range of stan-
dards,74 society relies on business practices and self-regulation. While
some companies may make a commitment to standards, self-regulation
raises several inherent problems. First, many companies do not wish to
implement any forceful standards. On a short-term basis, the exploitation
of transaction information collected without such restrictions has tremen-
dous value for marketing purposes. Second, even if companies do have
such policies, the policies are often invisible: because of the lack of pub-
licity and the absence of any obligation to disclose those company poli-
cies, citizens are not aware of them and cannot use them to access, check,
72. The DMA Guidelines call for access to personal information held by direct mar-
keters. DMA GUmELINES, supra note 52 at arts. 4-5. Compare Letter from Mary Doher,
Metromail, to Joel R. Reidenberg (Aug. 10, 1994) (providing extremely limited and mislead-
ing information in response to request for all personal information contained in company
databases) (on file with author) with Letter from Joel R. Reidenberg to Mary Doher (Aug.
16, 1994) (requesting full disclosure in conformity with the DMA GUIDELINES that provide
individuals a right to access that information) (on file with author). See also Letter from
Thomas Hiller, Vice President, Metromail, to Joel R. Reidenberg (Oct. 31, 1994) (stating
that even though the personal information sold by Metromail is a matter of public record,
Metromail did not disclose it because the company did not know requestor's (Joel
Reidenberg's) "credentials") (on fie with author).
73. For a further discussion of these standards, see supra notes 15-19 and accompany-
ing text.
74. The rare examples of specific statutes that cover the range of quality standards are
the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the
Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
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or correct their personal information. In sum, quality of information, as
one of the issues raised by the present treatment of personal information,
is, for the most part, entirely dependent upon unchecked self-regulators.
C. The Values Distorted by the Network
1. Few standards and poor quality
Ad hoc, narrowly targeted, and confusing standards cannot ensure
the quality of information in a fluid, multilayered network. When com-
bined with expanding networks, this approach creates an aggregate lack
of sufficient standards to assure the fair participation of citizens. Because
of the reactive nature of standards in the United States, citizens may be
involved with their personal information for specific situations, but they
will miss participating in both important cross-sectoral aspects and sec-
ondary uses of personal information. In effect, the network grants tre-
mendous social power to the collectors of information. Even where there
are far-sighted company policies, companies have little, if any, incentive
to police themselves. 5 The business community has complete control
over the disclosure of practices. The result is a lack of public awareness
that such practices exist. Citizens are simply not aware of the possibilities
afforded to them. Since citizens do not have access to their own informa-
tion and cannot check or correct it, there is no guarantee that the infor-
mation involved will be accurate despite the fact that the information and
its accuracy may be very important to the individuals involved, such as
patterns of telephone calls to particular numbers.
2. Lack of confidence
The multiplication of interactive communications increases the possi-
bility of hidden surveillance of private citizens. Industries obtain bits of
personal information from many sources. Interactive communications give
the transaction details such as those collected through a credit card tele-
phone call. Likewise, calls to toll free numbers, mail order purchases, as
well as subscription lists from publications, and purchasing patterns at
stores offer a great deal of information about individuals. 6 Even public
records provide information to an industry: property records, for exam-
ple, indicate the purchase price of an individual's home and any out-
standing mortgage amounts. Those items of information are then cross-
referenced and combined to establish detailed profiles of individuals.
Most citizens are unaware of the uses to which such collected information
is put. Ultimately, those profiles may result in the most amazing-and
sometimes most offending-personal details, such as women wearing
75. See H. JEFF ShMTH, MANAGING PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE
AMERICA 167, 174-78 (1994) (discussing the role of corporations in developing U.S. corporate
privacy domain).
76. See Jonathan Berry, Database Marketing, Bus. WK-, Sept. 5, 1994, at 56-62.
1995]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
wigs" or male buyers of fashion underwear.78 These types of uses form a
well-founded basis for the lack of citizen confidence in the treatment of
their personal information.
Originally, commercial enterprises favored these cross-sectoral uses
of information. However, they too are now experiencing a crisis of confi-
dence in the treatment of information. What appeared to be a short-term
benefit is turning out to be a long-term handicap. Indeed, when citizens
learn how their information is used, they are likely to react negatively
against the offending company.79 In addition, while companies may have
wanted unfettered access to information about individuals, they certainly
do not want their own corporate information to be used in the same fash-
ion. For example, companies will provide on-line public record informa-
tion to reveal data such as the address and purchase price of the home
owned by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,80 yet they have sup-
pressed the address of the American Express property in Phoenix, Ari-
zona, where the company profiles the spending patterns of its
cardholders.8 ' In another telling example, AT&T planned to offer sub-
scribers a directory of toll-free numbers; the directory sent to each recipi-
ent would match the profile of the household's calling patterns.8 2 Thus, a
directory of toll-free numbers for airlines would be sent to households
that frequently called airline numbers. AT&T's business clients, however,
objected vehemently to providing customers with information on their
competitors' toll-free numbers.88 These objections forced AT&T to aban-
don the project.
Even in terms of data integrity and security, the network distorts
business confidence. The Internet, for example, is a thoroughly unsecure
communications facility. Anyone can capture information transiting the
network. For businesses to take advantage of networks, they must be able
to assure the authenticity and confidentiality of communications. Encryp-
tion standards achieve this goal. Hence, when the federal government
proposed the Clipper Chip, the very idea that a corporation could lose
control over the encryption standard jeopardized corporate confidence in
network transmissions.
77. Carla Corcini Offers Wig Buyers, DM NEws, Oct. 19, 1992, at 54 (announcing "La-
dies Wig Buyers" file from Venture Communications International, Inc.).
78. Brawn of California Offers Three Lists, DM N.ws, Apr. 5, 1993, at 34.
79. See SrrTH, supra note 75, at 151-52.
80. See Property Record for Arlington County, Va., Jan. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Assets library, VAown fie (showing property address and details).
81. See Property Record for Phoenix, Az., available in LEXIS, Assets library, Azown
file (showing no property address for several entries).
82. Terry Brenknan, CADM Releases Its Unanimous Objection to AT&T 800 Direc-




3. Lack of global interoperability
The absence of comprehensive standards creates an important obsta-
cle for the business community in its relationships with foreign countries.
Indeed, the restrictions adopted over the last twenty years by some Euro-
pean countries and those contained in the European proposal have two
important consequences. First, the transfer of personal information may
be prohibited where the destination has insufficient privacy.8' Second, the
existing landscape raises the stakes for American businesses.
Foreign countries are necessarily interested in assessing the adequacy
of American standards. Since there is no general set of legal standards,
business practices will be under greater scrutiny and American businesses
will be forced to justify the legitimacy of data flows to the United States.
This scrutiny raises challenges for American businesses and can directly
affect numerous activities, from payroll processing to travel reservations.
The lack of compatibility with foreign countries also undermines business
confidence, making the need for compatibility with foreign standards a
large incentive to articulate and pursue key values.
IV. DIRECTIONS AND INCENTIVES TOWARD THE KEY VALuEs
Global networks set new directions and incentives for society to move
toward the key values. The need for confidence in the network realigns
interests and pressures both within and outside the United States.
A. Old Calls for Regulation Getting New Life
There have been numerous proposals in Congress over the last two
decades to establish a Privacy Protection Commission, most without any
regulatory powers over the private sector. Until recently, there had been
significant opposition in the business community to such proposals. This
opposition is beginning to change, however, as businesses realize that the
promulgation of fair standards will contribute to the development of a
global information economy and will protect businesses as well. Despite
the increased recognition of the value of fair information practice stan-
dards, even now, it is doubtful that a Privacy Protection Commission
84. See France, Loi no. 78-17 du 25 Janvier 1978, art. 24, reprinted in A.C.M. NUGTER,
TRANSBORDER FLOW OF PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE EC 353 app. C at 358 (1990); United
Kingdom, Data Protection Act 1984, par. 12(2), reprinted in NUGTER, supra, at 366 app. D
at 372. See generally Martine Briat, Personal Data Flow and the Free Flow of Information
in FREEDOM OF DATA FLOWS AND EEC LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF 2ND CELIM CONFERENCE
(1988); Peter Blume, An EEC Policy for Data Protection, 11 COmpuTER/L.J. 399 (1992);
Michael Kirby, Legal Aspects of Transborder Data Flow, 11 COmnuTERfL.J. 233 (1991). See
also Reidenberg, Privacy Obstacle Course, supra note 20, at S160-S165. As for the revised
proposal, it still contains an important clause requiring the examination on data transfers
outside the European Union to be permitted upon review of the sufficiency of standards at
the destination. See Reidenberg, Rules of the Road, supra note 26, at 294 (arguing that first
draft of directive which contemplated a blacklist of countries with inadequate standards for
fair treatment of information was actually less likely to result in transfer prohibitions than
revised proposal).
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with regulatory power over the private sector would be welcomed by the
business community.
Notwithstanding such continued opposition, a Privacy Protection
Commission, even without regulatory powers, would still bring important
benefits to the American component of the information society. A Com-
mission would be instrumental in achieving public awareness of informa-
tion practices and in securing greater citizen participation in the
circulation of personal information. This step is critical to restore and
develop citizen confidence in networks.
For business, a Commission, even with an advisory role rather than
regulatory power, would be an ally for the development of publicly ac-
ceptable standards. A Commission might also assist in making technologi-
cal choices to achieve fair standards. Such activities would contribute to
business confidence in the long-term viability of information markets and
the fair treatment of business information. Further, a Commission would
be able to promote American interests in the global marketplace.
B. Shifting Business Incentives85
Global networks shift the perspective of American businesses and
may help persuade lobbies to accept legal rules. American companies are
beginning to understand that an absence of comprehensive private-sector
standards harms the perception of business integrity in both domestic
and international spheres. A number of major companies in the United
States are already recognizing that fair information practices will define
information services on the global network: they even refer, in their cor-
porate annual reports, to the strategic importance of privacy policies.80
To be efficient, the development of corporate policies and standards
requires the existence of disclosure rules. Indeed, invisible policies or
practices disserve the business community as a whole. In addition to
causing harm to relationships between businesses and citizens, invisibility
threatens businesses directly. The cornerstone of the Clipper Chip propo-
sal involved key escrow and invisibility of the encryption standard.87 The
strong business opposition illustrates the threat such invisibility (and
government control of security) poses to confidence within the business
community for network interactions.
Ironically, global corporations also have a strong incentive to support
comprehensive standards of fair information practices. Standards can
protect long-term global markets for large companies against competitors
seeking short-term profits. As the leading corporate examples show, large
companies are the first to recognize and value fair information practices.
Telecommunications carriers like Pacific Bell and financial services com-
panies like American Express, Equifax, and Dun & Bradstreet are seeking
85. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 48.
86. DuN & BRADSTREET, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT (1993), available in LEXIS, Naars li-
brary, 93 file; EQUwAX, INC., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT (1991), available in LEXIS, Naars library,
91 file.
87. See OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 4, at 117-19.
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to adapt to the new environment. This is not surprising. Large companies
face greater scrutiny on both the domestic and international fronts be-
cause they are more visible and have more opportunities to abuse infor-
mation. In order to protect their image and to keep their clients, large
companies have had to develop standards. This evolution has now given
them a competitive advantage with respect to smaller, less-noticed
companies.
CONCLUSION
The establishment and the effective preservation of key values is an
absolute necessity if we want to improve our daily lives without paying
too great a social cost for the development of a networked society. It is
possible to do so. Moreover, the network, as it is, may help us in our
quest for those key values.
The emerging network amplifies many features of the treatment of
personal information. It has made information more available and easier
to access. It has increased the quantity of information available in society.
It has multiplied the options for users. It has enabled multiple uses of
information and developed the possibilities of cross-sectoral uses. At the
same time, it has brought instantaneous connections around the globe.
Networks thus appear to have contributed to the attainment of key val-
ues such as broad availability of information, increased quantities of in-
formation, low barriers to access and use, and interoperability with the
rest of the world.
However, networks appear to present a conflict with the values of
confidence and participation. Indeed, multiple secondary and cross-
sectoral uses and broad access to information, coupled with a total ab-
sence of fair standards, first undermine the confidence of citizens and
then lead to the distrust of businesses and governments. The only way to
restore this confidence is to promote the participation of all actors in the
establishment of fair standards for the treatment of information. Appro-
priately enough, networks may help in this endeavor. The Infobahn, by
its magnifying effect, is at the source of a certain number of critical
abuses, especially those regarding secondary and cross-sectoral uses.
These abuses themselves are the origin of the reaction we now witness,
namely the crisis of confidence of citizens and businesses in the treatment
of information. As strange as it may seem, this reaction might be our best
chance to reach and enforce key values. The refusal of citizens to be
manipulated, the improved behavior of private companies, and a new rec-
ognition in Congress of the importance of fair information practices to
citizens and the economy could finally constitute enough pressure to
cause reconsideration of the old attitude founded on targeted standards,
diversity of sources, and self-regulation. Like all good things, however,
such a change will no doubt take time, responsibility, and patience.
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